On the thoughts of ISW analysts , the replenishment of the Russian army with recruits will not allow it to carry out large-scale offensive operations in multiple directions, the fragments of the new reserves will not be able to operate as a force to penetrate the first or other echelons.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, having noted 8 cherches, that part of the 30 thousand military servicemen that Russia is mobilizing is arriving at the front as replacement and reinforcement, that Russian efforts with mobilization allowed the occupiers to create more operational and strategic reserves.
< p>Mashovets stated that in the average Russian operational grouping will be removed from 1,000 to 1,500 military servicemen as a replacement or to strengthen the conflict and can be removed 2 000, as grouping indicates intensive offensive operations.
There are six operational Russian military groups in and around Ukraine. This means that Mashovets assumes that the Russian military will recruit 6,000 to 12,000 new military servicemen in the process.
They mean that this figure does not correspond to Ukrainian and Russian reports for the month of 2024 about the fact that Russia is recruiting 30,000 new military service members this month, The fragments are partly significant for this new special warehouse for the functions of combat security and support for combat service or later, After the start, we will take over the functions of combat commands.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on the 7th that in 2024 Russia recruited 160,000 new military servicemen, This figure is entirely consistent with information about those Russian armored vehicles force to recruit close to 30 000 military servicemen per month.
Analysts indicate that the Russian military has accelerated its initiative across the entire territory of the front in order to determine the pace of military operations in Ukraine in the remaining months, which, as it appears, will lead to approximately equal or a few smaller, lower equal levels of newly created forces.
< Experts add that this balance between Russian expenses and newly created forces is important, however, so that the Russian military does not intensify offensive operations during the three-year period. This balance is becoming even narrower, since it is impossible for the Russian special warehouse to absorb expenses and form new forces.
Over the rest of the month, ISW maintained a “pulsation” Russian offensive operations on the front, if the zagarbniks are planning intensive attacks at a lower operational pace to replenish expenses.
The appearance of a new special warehouse, obviously, is one of the many initial officials who pour into the decisions of the Russian military with intense offensive operations with less intensive operations.
According to ISW estimates, the planned Russian reserves of the operational and strategic level are unlikely to be ready to carry out effective large-scale and combined attacks.
The combination of Russian reserves of the operational and strategic level, as it is reported, will be insufficient to support immediate large-scale offensive efforts on several directions. The Russian military command will likely have to turn one main direction during the full summer offensive operation, as it intends to stock up on reserves to support a large-scale offensive operation ii.
Prepared by: Nina Petrovich